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Orwell's 1984

Orwell's 1984 and the Lonely World
of Campaign Management
GEORGE W. GEffi
Butler University
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ne of the great dreams of western democracy is a vision of
an informed electorate, able to base its decisions upon a reasoned evaluation
of candidates and their issues. One of our great nightmares is the inversion of
that vision, complete with an uninformed populace making non-rational (or
even irrational) choices. And one of the great expressions of that nightmarish
vision is Orwell's 1984.
Its author was an unusual social critic. From the moment his novel appeared
35 years ago, it attracted a devoted following among the political Right, who
cheered what they saw as a thinly veiled denunciation of Stalinism and the Left.
In practice, however, Orwell was a supporter of the British Labor Party, and
his sympathies lay somewhere within the broad confines of social democracy.
Early marketers of his volume often treated it as a romance, stressing the
sexuality he wove into his plot. Yet Orwell intended to title his work The Last
Man in Europe as a reminder of the humanistic thrust he wished to project.
Interpreters ever since have faced similar struggles trying to categorize both the
man and his ideas.
Part of the problem lies in the fact that Orwell chose a title that appeared
to proclaim him a futurist, while much of the novel appears to be poor prophecy.
The scarcity and enforced rationing that he had experienced in the 1940s yielded
to the mass marketed prosperity of the 1950s and '60s, and the direct conflict
of superpowers that he had known gave way to smaller surrogate wars. The
mind-numbing bureaucracy and foul cafeteria food he portrayed may be found
in most high schools, but are much less apparent to a modern "high tech/high
touch" society. The modern west, in short, failed to adopt the most flagrant
manifestations of his dystopian vision.
Still, Orwell has survived well. His book is found on every list of significant
modern political novels, and its paperback edition soared back up the best-seller
charts as the actual year of 1984 arrived. Something about his portray) of a
totalitarian bureaucracy remains strangely plausible and compelling. Something
still causes us to ask if it could happen here. Something that he saw in the
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politics of 1948 is still able to engage our attention. It's worth asking what that
wac;.
The year 1948 saw many interesting political events, including the presidential contest that pitted Harry Truman against Tom Dewey. Roosevelt was dead,
and the GOP was already showing signs of the strength that would allow them
to win five of the first nine post-war elections for president and to closely
contest three others. It was also one of the first elections to be closely monitored
by the new profession of public opinion research. Scientific surveys were little
more than a decade old. But some of the more visible pollsters were already
gaining headlines with studies that the press frequently, albeit mistakenly, called
predictions. The most notable, of course, was the six percent October lead that
Gallup called for Dewey. Some interpreted the ensuing Truman victory as proof
that the "pollsters are wrong", but the pollsters more accurately interpreted
that election as proof they needed to refine and tighten their procedures - and
shun any claims to prophecy.
The consequences of those decisions are well known to us today. Any
professional market opinion firm can now guarantee that with a proper sampling
technique they can measure voter opinion at a given time with a margin of error
of no more than plus or minus 3% in 19 tries out of 20. It isn't always cheap:
a good survey can cost upwards of $10,000. And any buyer of a survey is well
advised to have the firm's best mind analyze the data before using it. Yet, with
cautions of that type, a new world of insights has opened to us in the last three
dcsadc~

Much of what we have learned has served simply to confirm the pluralism
of American society. We know that differences of attitude by region, income,
education. race, sex, and religion are all realiti~s of our time- although not
always by the margins we'd expect. We know that these differences all show
correlations with voter choice, and even with the decision whether to vote at
all. At the same time we've seen many of the stereotypes of political analysis
crumble. We know, for example, that the modern ma<;s rally is as often the
result of improved mobilization of existing constituencies as it is the result of
new issues or enlarged public concern. And we've become suspicious of the
idea of electoral mandates since noting that many voters do not share the views
of their candidates on a variety of specific issues. 2
More significant for our discussion, we've learned two key features of the
electorate that are deeply disturbing to anyone raised in traditional democratic
rhetoric. Simply put, the electorate isn't always consistent, and the electorate
isn't always well informed. The consistency theme became particularly apparent
in the 1960s when a series of studies showed voters straddling key issues of
principle and policy. Free and Cantril,3 for example, found majorities of Americans "conservative" on most matters of principle, "liberal" on most matters
of policy, and little concerned about any inconsistancy. The knowledge theme
appeared regularly as pollsters asked questions of specific information, and then
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reported the percentages of people who appeared to lack the most elementary
factual data. Name recognition tests showed incumbent U. S. Senators unknown
to half their adult constituents, and one test showed half of graduating high
school seniors unable to give the correct number of U. S. Senators from their
state.
Such findings, of course, are typical of the information that has come to
the attention of political managers, and come at a time when it's possible to
convert survey information into vote production. There has been a quiet revolution in campaign mechanics in the last quarter century that has allowed a new
generation of technocrats to supplement, or even supplant, the old party organizations. Many of these new managers are specialists within a speciality, dealing
with direct mail, telephone banks, paid media, or fund raising. All have become
skilled in converting numbers into votes.•
The folklore of the field pays homage to a handful of campaigns that have
become a paradigm for subsequent races. Republicans, for example, like to
harken back to Nelson Rockefeller's 1966 re-election bid for governor in New
York. Rocky entered the race a clear underdog, widely disliked even within
his party. But careful polling identified first pollution and then education as
"soft" issues he could capitalize upon- and a series of skillful television ads,
including a simulated interview with a fish, exploited those issues to set him
on the road to a narrow victory.
Democrats are fond of citing campaigns by Matt Reese as one of their
models. Reese's approach is to use massive telephone banks, staffed by minimum
wage employees, to contact voters among those groups and in those areas that
surveys suggest could become favorable to his causes. Reese's successes, particularly in defeating "right to work" referenda, is a reminder that the new
technology can serve issues and interests as well as individual candidates.
The role of the new technocrats is most apparent in presidential elections.
Since Theodore White's best seller, The Making ofthe President, 1960,S showed
how campaigns develop a life of their own, we've experienced an increasing
flood of insider's and observer's accounts that convey the contemporary logic
of politics. We know, for example, that Ronald Reagan's decision to oppose
the Panama Canal treaty in GOP primaries in 1979 was made after a focus
group pinpointed the issue for him; that most national television advertising in
1980 was concentrated upon local stations in key electoral vote states; or that
Jesse Jackson found intensive advertising over radio stations that offer rhythm
and soul programming to be the best tool for turning out voters from a segmented
media market. The Ferraro nomination followed hard upon the pollster's discovery of the "gender gap".
The same trend recurs at the state and local level where growing numbers
of campaign managers are emulating the national trend setters. Jesse Helms
became the "six million dollar man" through targeted direct mailings in his
1978 campaign, even if he had to use over 80% of that sum to cover direct
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mail costs. George Duekemjian tipped the scales in California by a carefully
timed mailing of over a million absentee ballot applications in 1982. The Republican party boasts of its "two percent solution" which helped them to preserve
control of the Senate in 1982 by concentrating resources in states where a two
percent voter shift could win or lose a race. A visitor to the American Association
of Political Consultants annual conference can add to the list almost indefinitely. 6
Even George Orwell has been taken into account as campaign marketers carefully
stress "84" without the mention of" 19" in their advertising.
Such craft, of course, has its limits. Any candidate who expects a fast ride
to victory on the shoulders of. his staff would be well advised to recall some
sobering cautions. The new style is expensive: the Federal Election Commission
reported an average of$345,000 spent by winning members of the U.S. House
of Representatives in 1980. The new style is demanding: it requires you, for
example, to remember that the attention span of the average voter is measured
in seconds, not minutes. The new style is unforgiving: it encourages targeted
attacks, particularly upon radio. In short, the new style is neutral: it is as
available to your opponent as it is to you. It promises no end to spirited election
contests. But it does suggest the demise of many older campaign approaches.
The great losers in this transformation have almost certainly been the
traditional political parties of America. It may still be useful to run with a party
for the "invisible" offices at the lower end of the ticket. But once one crosses
the line to become visible to the voter, the label of party quickly fades to be
replaced by an intensely political appeal conducted at the personal level. The
old precinct and ward leaders yield to a small cadre of professional specialists
whose loyalty lies with the candidate.
It probably would do a disservice to the older party leaders to suggest that
they were any less interested in winning, and it would be as much a disservice
to the new technocrats to suggest they are more cynical or opportunistic. But
in important ways the change is still dramatic. The election worker is becoming
invisible. Mail, telephone, and paid media may well provide an individual more
contact with a campaign than ever before, but interpersonal contact has grown
progressively less. We will see much of the 1984 election, but few voters will
ever see even one worker in the flesh before they reach the polls.
It's an impersonality many sense, but one that few have been able to
articulate. And among those few stands George Orwell. To reread 1984 is to
grasp a world of political loneliness, where even a loyal party member feels
divorced from the seat of power and unable to participate in meaningful decisionmaking. Whatever else it may be, Orwell's nightmare is the nightmare of the
grass-roots politician, who sees his vision of personal interaction between individuals and government passing from the scene. And there lies much of Orwell's
relevance and his continuing humanistic appeal.
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NOTES
I

The new directions of campaigns are nicely summarized in Roben Agranoff, The Management of
Election Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976).
2. Most widely quoted is Norman Nie, et al., The Dlanging American Voter, enlarged edition,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
3. Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1968).
4. The journal, Campaigns and Elections, offers the most varied coverage of these developments,
with heavy stress upon fund raising considerations.
5. (New York: Pocket Books, 1961)
6. The journal, Public Opimon, as panacularly good at covering these developments and in relating
them to survey data repons .

The New South African Constitution and
Relations Between the Nonwhite Populations
J. DOUGLAS NELSON
Anderson College

T h e issue of the preservation of "white civilization" in South
Africa has been openly debated since the end of World War II. Alarmed by the
increasing numbers of nonwhite people in the urban areas, White voters elected
a Nationalist Party Government committed to apartheid which its leaders originally described as a permanent solution. The difficulties that South Africa has
experienced, both domestically and internationally, since the early 1960s are a
clear expression of the failure of apartheid to achieve its expectations. In 1977
the Nationalist Party government under the leadership of P. W. Botha began
promoting reforms and the development of a new constitution which was implemented fully in September, 1984. The growing cooperation between African
and the Colored and Asian populations has been one of the factors that has
served both as a stimulant to change and an influence on its direction. Racial
divisions had until the 1970s largely precluded a workable level of nonwhite
unity.
The new constitution, adopted in a White referendum on November 2,
1983, creates the appearance of movement away from exclusively White rule
to a system of shared power with the Colored and Asian populations. The
tricameral parliament being created provides for separate bodies for the White,
Colored and Asian peoples. Prime Minister Botha has stated: "A new basis for
National unity has been established upon which evolutionary reform accompanied by stability can be built . . . . South Africa has made an appointment
with the future by voting 'Yes' .'' 1 Since the new system essentially maintains
White power unchecked and leaves Africans totally out of the national structure,
few observers regard the new constitution as a long term solution to White
problems of governance. It is the purpose of this paper to examine briefly the
issues the new structure raises for interracial cooperation among Africans, Colored and Asians. The matter is of major significance, because a united opposition
to White rule based on race would put the present structure under even more
serious domestic strain.
The new constitution was promoted as a positive step in sharing power
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